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Book Reviews
Strategy
The Future of Strategy
By Colin S. Gray
Reviewed by MAJ Nathan K. Finney, Strategic Planner, US Army Pacific

W

hen addressing the future of strategy, there are few authors more
credentialed than strategist Colin S. Gray. Aside from his practical
experience addressing nuclear issues in the Reagan administration, he
also taught and wrote authoritative texts on the topic for 50 years For
those not familiar with Gray’s prior works, The Future of Strateg y draws
significantly from his vast bibliography on strategy, which is evident
in the first six chapters. These chapters provide a succinct, cohesive
thumbnail of arguments Gray made in previous books, including his
trilogy, The Strateg y Bridge, Perspectives on Strateg y, and Strateg y and Defence
Planning, which describe his “general theory of strategy,” its practice in
the creation of particular strategies, the importance of understanding
strategic history, and how nuclear weapons are an exception to past
strategic history and therefore its place in the development of strategy.
While largely redundant with past books, these chapters are concise and
easily digested in comparison to the necessarily detailed and expansive
explanations in his separate works.
For those more familiar with Gray’s previous works, The Future of
Strateg y can act as a quick refresher, as well as solidifying his view that
the future of strategy, as it is a human endeavor “will be near identical
in its functions and purposes to the strategy of the past and present.”
Indeed, according to Gray, there is a logical consistency to strategy—
both as a theory and in application—that transcends particular time or
context. Strategy is fundamentally a mechanism for human societies to
solve problems that arise in relation to their needs. Therefore, “we do not
need to be taught to consider the world in terms of the ends we desire,
and the ways and means for gaining them. It is all but inconceivable
to approach problems in any other way” (115).
One item that jumps out in The Future of Strateg y, though it is covered
in most of his previous works, is the focus Gray places on geography,
and specifically his addition of a new term—“geostrategy”—to describe
its importance. I take issue with this new moniker given in previous
works and woven throughout this book. Gray cites geography as merely
one, though significant, aspect within strategy as a whole and the
development of context-driven strategies in particular. I wonder if
current events in Europe and Asia that many have titled the “return
of geopolitics” drove Gray to focus on geography in a desire for
relevance beyond the timeless wisdom that is typically found in his
works. One positive by-product of this geographical focus is a tangent
on the importance of logistics to the application of strategy. As Gray
mentions, “Global strategic history always has been governed in practice
by logistics . . . it would be a great mistake to assume potentially
significant logistical challenges no longer matter” (89).
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The most value to be found for those familiar with Gray’s previous
works is the addendum following his conclusion, in which he lays out
a veritable master-class reading list all aspiring or practicing strategists
should attempt to understand. It is no spoiler to say that Clausewitz’s On
War tops the list, though I was surprised to see Svechin’s Strateg y closing
out the list, as well as Gray’s comparison of it to On War (as well as his
comparison of Svechin to Clausewitz in his dedication).
Overall, The Future of Strateg y is a solid, concise version of many
of Gray’s previous works. I recommend military and civilian leaders
unfamiliar with Gray, or those who are generally interested in—or likely
to conduct—the development of strategy, read this book. The Future
of Strateg y should also be used by all professional military and civilian
academic institutions attempting to teach both the theory and the
practice of strategy, given its cheap cost and short length but deep level
of intellectual material.

The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought
By Lukas Milevski
Reviewed by Tom Moriarty, Professorial Lecturer, School of International
Service, American University

W
New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
175 pages
$80.00

ar, whether or not we like to acknowledge it, has left a transcendent
imprint on our lives. Many of our most important and cherished
institutions, processes, and inventions have been influenced or modified by war, just as war has been decisively altered by them. Because of
the nature of that interaction—of the constant push and pull of those
forces—society’s interest in armed conflict has forever persisted. Yet, not
all elements of the study of war have been treated with the equivalence
they deserve. Historically, the study, appreciation, and understanding of
strategy and strategic thought have often failed to keep stride with the
torrid pace of the evolution of war itself. Indeed, the study of strategy
has often been exiled to the lecture halls of military academies, war colleges, and a precious handful of civilian universities. Fortunately, that
trend has slowly begun to swing upward, as has the number of scholarly
works devoted to those neglected subjects. One such work is The Evolution
of Modern Grand Strategic Thought by Lukas Milevski.
While primarily targeted toward advanced, serious-minded strategy
scholars, Milevski’s book nevertheless remains accessible to any readers
interested in grand strategy, tracing the development of grand strategic
thought, mostly in the English-speaking world, during the last 200 years.
Whereas the first half of the book examines strategic thinking from the
Napoleonic Wars until the latter part of World War II, the second half
explores the decline of grand strategic thinking during the initial stages
of the Cold War before charting its reemergence toward the end of the
conflict. A closing chapter assesses the continued interest in strategic
thought after the Cold War.
In addition to providing its intellectual history, Milevski offers
a clear, compelling critique of grand strategic thinking. He argues that
grand-strategy theorists, driven by a pressing desire to solve immediate
problems, have become so consumed in their present circumstances
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they have seldom looked to history and theory for guidance. Although
this oversight might not initially seem like a cause for concern, Milevski
makes the case that such emphasis on solving today’s problems has
prompted scholars to be predominantly ahistorical in their search for
solutions. If Milevski is correct, then truly understanding today’s grand
strategies does not require us to understand the history and theoretical
underpinnings of the past; on the contrary, it requires an appreciation of
current geopolitical realities. As such, grand strategic thinking has not
so much evolved as much as it has simply changed.
As a student, scholar, and teacher of strategic thinking, I share most
of Milevski’s frustrations. Doubtlessly, the strength of his book is the
demonstration of the partial incoherence and fragmentation of grand
strategic thinking. Serious gaps riddle our knowledge; little agreement
exists on even some of the most basic elements of grand strategy, including a unified definition, and even our attention to the need of grand
strategy has been inconsistent. Milevski’s case that grand strategy needs
more theoretical robustness, greater emphasis on logic and empirics, and
a renewed focus on historical trends that can provide today’s thinkers
guidance from the past hit home with me, as I am sure it will for other
readers as well.
Although I am entirely sympathetic to Milevski’s arguments, I
remain unconvinced of the consequences of his conclusions. As an
educator, it would make my life much easier if we achieved greater
conceptual clarity and unity on many of the issues Milevski raises. Yet,
I do not believe it would make the lives of political leaders, military
officers, and practitioners of grand strategy any easier, nor would it be
particularly helpful to them, either, because strategy is better conceived
as an art instead of as a science.
The same rigidness that serves hard sciences such as physics and
chemistry so well can have the opposite effect on many disciplines,
including strategic thinking. Of course, this argument does not mean
history and theory play no role. Grand strategy, however, means different things to different people at different times because context is
important. Changes in the international system, the emergence of new
technologies, the power of norms and international laws, and the intensity
of domestic political debate all affect a state’s conceptual understandings
of what is the best grand strategy to use. And that is okay.
Nonetheless, The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought is
an extremely timely, efficient work on grand strategy that I believe
will greatly improve the quality of debate about—and appreciation
for—the subject.

124

Parameters 46(4) Winter 2016–17

A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects
in East Asia
By Thomas A. Drohan
Reviewed by J. Andres Gannon, Researcher, Center for Peace and Security
Studies (cPASS), University of California, San Diego

New York: Cambria Press,
2016
326 pages
$29.95

U

S military strategy in recent years has approached the increased
complexity of East Asian threats through narrow changes to
combined-arms warfare. According to Thomas A. Drohan in A New
Strategy for Complex Warfare, US strategists first need a historical analysis
of the region to foster a multicultural understanding of security that
no longer assumes common values among Asian nations or projects
American cultural expectations onto other societies. In placing weaponscentric strategic changes front and center, policymakers are putting the
cart before the horse. Thankfully Drohan, a scholar with a doctorate
from Princeton who now heads the Department of Military and Strategic
Studies at the US Air Force Academy after years of his own military
service, is in a unique position to bridge this gap between academic
theorists and policy practitioners, a task he successfully accomplishes.
Drohan’s main argument assumes culture affects decisions made
about security strategy. What nations consider right and just differs, and
their perception shapes their definition of the national interest and how
they pursue relative security. Thus, effective foreign policy requires an
understanding of the diverse views different cultures have on security.
Security culture explains how nations determine what constitutes a
threat and how to counter them, reflects preferences affecting strategic
performance, and outlines operational concepts that may be unique to
each nation. What nations consider rational varies in accordance with
values and interests.
While intuitive, the resulting task initially seems daunting. It is
understandable why policy practitioners have focused doctrinal changes
on new understandings of technological evolution, force integration, and
US-centered threat assessment. Fortunately, A New Strateg y for Complex
Warfare does much of the heavy lifting required for acquiring a proper
understanding of Asian security cultures. Few works have succeeded
as much as this one at succinctly explaining centuries of Asian cultural
history and contextualizing that history to current security issues in the
region. Members of the security community will greatly benefit from
this unique perspective.
Drohan’s book aims at improving US strategic choices toward
China, Korea, and Japan. For each country, he provides a chapter on
past dominant security culture to help readers understand the underlying motivations behind the unique values and interests driving the
country’s actions. This historical analysis, based on impressive primary
material in numerous Asian languages, is complemented by a chapter
contextualizing the role culture plays in explaining each country’s
approaches to contemporary security crises. Chinese security culture,
one of asserting sovereignty and harmonizing physical and psychological
tools to reinforce asymmetric operations, assumes threats are permanent and solutions to those threats are temporary. Korea’s history (here
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referring to both Korean nations) of accommodating a main power and
seeking autonomy pragmatically has resulted in external powers being
confronted with diplomatic balancing and only limited force. Lastly,
Japanese security culture, characterized by uniqueness and ambivalence
in foreign relations, explains the slow pace of change that favors only
reactive isolation and engagement.
True to his original motivation, Drohan does not simply provide
policymakers with pages of historical detail and no guidelines for
determining its relevance. He excels in explaining the implications
cultural histories have for US security strategy and prescribes both
philosophical and pragmatic changes practitioners should make.
Philosophically, Drohan develops a combined-effects model that
categorizes actions by regional actors and aids in the examination of the
interactions between the concepts. Deterrence versus compellence and
dissuasion versus persuasion are examples of how policymakers should
think about combined effects and how strategic choices interact with
one another from a military and diplomatic standpoint. Each chapter
concludes with a table that neatly summarizes approaches to security
crises based on the cultural influences identified.
Drohan effectively argues his approach should foster an awareness
of combined effects beyond the narrow combined-arms approach currently dominating strategic thinking. Pragmatically, he offers concrete
suggestions like changes to the Quadrennial Defense Review and revised
mission priorities that encourage practitioners to incorporate security
culture into strategy making. By doing so, Drohan hopes US policy for
the region can transform from a “one-size-fits-all,” weapons-centric
approach to a multicultural understanding of the strategic interactions of
the combined effects of different nations’ policies. By considering values
and beliefs, policymakers can better judge and anticipate intentions and
capabilities as well as select the proper tools to address effectively US
goals in East Asia.
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US Military
The Future of Land Warfare
By Michael E. O’Hanlon
Reviewed by Steven K. Metz, Director of Research, Strategic Studies Institute,
US Army War College

F
Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2015
254 pages
$32.00

or several years, proposals to cut America’s land forces have been
making the rounds in Washington, driven by the belief the United
States is unlikely to undertake large-scale ground combat in the coming
years. As Brookings Institution scholar Michael O’Hanlon explains in
The Future of Land Warfare, “Fatigued by Iraq and Afghanistan, rightly
impressed by the capabilities of U.S. special forces, transfixed by the
arrival of new technologies such as drones, and increasingly preoccupied
with a rising China and its military progress in domains ranging from
space to missile forces to maritime operations, the American strategic
community has largely turned away from thinking about ground combat.”
It is not hard to understand the context of the idea that the strategic
utility of American landpower is in decline: for eight years the Obama
national security strategy recognized the utility of military force in the
demanding conflict with transnational Islamic extremism but based on
the assumption ground combat should be avoided whenever possible.
Given this assumption, it is logical to conclude that as the US military
shrinks, the services should not be cut proportionately but land rather
than air, naval, or space forces should be slashed the most. As a February
2013 discussion paper from the Brookings Institution Hamilton Project,
National Defense in a Time of Change by Gary Roughead and Kori Schake,
argued, “the military’s current strategy sustains an Army that is far
larger than necessary.”
O’Hanlon’s book is a sober, well-documented attack on that idea,
making the case that American landpower has enduring value far
beyond the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. After a sweep of the
security landscape to identify “strategic fault lines” and plausible conflict, O’Hanlon concludes there is “a strong case for keeping an Army,
and a Marine Corps, with a broad range of capabilities.” He bases his
assessment on a range of potential missions the US military might
perform: deterring Russia and China; securing the South China Sea;
helping South Asia after a security crisis; deterring Iran; restoring order
in places like Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Nigeria; and handling a further
meltdown in law and order in Central America. From this assessment,
he believes US military planning should be based on a “1 + 2 posture”
that he defines as the ability to wage one major all-out regional battle
while contributing to two smaller, multiyear, multilateral operations of
different possible character.
Ultimately, O’Hanlon advocates continuity, sustaining landpower
capabilities about the same size and configuration of American ground
forces as today. “Much of this American ground capability,” he writes,
“should remain in the active duty forces, the implication is that not only
the aggregate size but also the individual components of the U.S. Army
should remain roughly as they are today as well . . . The Army of the
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future should not be radically different from the Army of today.” He
concludes by arguing, “America’s grand strategy is working. The Army
and Marine Corps are crucial elements in that strategy, for deterring
conflict, partnering with allies and others abroad, resolving conflicts
when necessary, and helping keep the peace in general. But their work,
and that of the nation, is far from done. We would be tempting fate
and playing with danger if we were to remove or significantly weaken
some of the key linchpins in the successful strategy of the last 70 years
out of a conviction that warfare, or the world, or the nature of man had
dramatically changed.”
While this is sage and carefully constructed advice, there are two
problems with The Future of Land Warfare, one modest and one more
significant. The modest problem arises from O’Hanlon’s approach
to force sizing, particularly in terms of stabilization operations or
counterinsurgency. He repeatedly uses a force-sizing rule of thumb
from the 2007 version of Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency
doctrine which has since been superseded by a newer version that does not
stress this guideline. The rule was dropped because it is not applicable to
all counterinsurgency operations but only to large-scale US involvement
in pacification and stabilization. The rule was developed for nation and
security-force creation rather than nation and security-force assistance.
A different form of counterinsurgency—think El Salvador rather than
Iraq and Afghanistan—would not require as many US forces.
More important, O’Hanlon’s analysis was based on the assumption
that the grand strategies of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama
administrations—which were more alike than different—would
continue into the future. This assumption might have been true had
Hillary Clinton won the 2016 presidential election as expected. But,
Donald Trump won the presidency while claiming American grand
strategy is not working. The most fundamental premise of US strategy
since the beginning of the Cold War—that the United States should
be the guarantor of a liberal world order—is being challenged. The
problem with Trump questioning existing American grand strategy is
that he has not yet proposed an alternative.
If Trump does not transform American grand strategy, then
O’Hanlon’s analysis and recommendations will remain germane
to anyone interested in US security. If, however, there is a Trump
revolution in US grand strategy, the analysis of American landpower
must begin anew.
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Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors: U.S. Civil-Military
Relations and Multilateral Intervention
By Stefano Recchia
Reviewed by Marybeth P. Ulrich, Professor of Government, Department of
National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

Ithaca, NY: Cambria Press,
2016
281 pages
$39.95

I

n Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, Stefano Recchia, a lecturer in
international relations at Cambridge University, investigates the role
civil-military relations played in US efforts to gain the support of international organizations for the use of force. His central hypothesis is “when
there is no clear threat to US national security and policymakers consequently disagree about the merits of intervention, a determined military
leadership can veto the use of American force” (51). In short, Recchia
argues senior military leaders at the apex of political-military decisionmaking can effectively veto policy when civilian policymakers are divided
and the national interest is less than vital. In such scenarios, the military
may demand the government obtain the support of international organizations as a condition of the military’s backing of the intervention.
Recchia argues further the military’s demand for an international
organization mandate is also linked to the military’s preference for
such resolutions to state explicitly that US intervention forces will hand
over control to multinational follow-on forces. The existence of such
a provision in the planning phase of the operation will not only facilitate the planning process itself with the inclusion of the assumption of
the presence of multinational stabilization forces, but will also fulfill
the military’s post Weinberger-Powell Doctrine desire for a clear exit
strategy before giving its assent to the use of force. The United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) would usually be the first choice to endorse
the intervention given its unique status as the organization the Charter
of the United Nations authorizes to approve the use of force, but the
approval of other regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization of American States
(OAS) may also suffice.
Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors is remarkable on many levels.
First, its four case studies: Haiti (1993–94), Bosnia (1992–95), Kosovo
(1998–99), and Iraq (2002–03) are extraordinarily well researched.
Recchia conducted over 100 interviews with primary participants in the
cases to include US secretaries of state and defense, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, national security advisers, US ambassadors to the
UN, NATO, and the European Union, and many more with individuals
holding positions a tier or two below the principals. The breadth and
depth of the interviews enabled Recchia to include many insights from
these key participants’ in the deeply sourced text, some of which directly
supported his hypothesis. The case studies alone, which include many of
these comments, merit acquiring the book.
Second, Recchia illustrates (literally—with useful figures) the
factors influencing the military’s viewpoint, their methods for exerting
policy influence, and specific conditions that will make the military’s
“insistence” to acquire international organization approval more
or less likely. Third, through the development of his primary and
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alternative hypotheses, he provides readers a rich review of the various
factors, conditions, and theory that explains why international organization approval is or is not sought as well as methods employed to
acquire approval.
If the book falls short in any area, it is in Recchia’s neglect to consider whether the behaviors he documents on the part of senior military
leaders fall outside the bounds of civil-military norms. First, there is the
discussion of the military’s “veto” power. While Recchia painstakingly
completes the “process tracing” of the impact of the civilian and military
actors in each case, he does not note the military is in what Eliot Cohen
deemed an “unequal dialogue” with civilian policymakers, meaning
a military veto is inconsistent with the principle of civilian control.
Consequently, the table detailing “How the generals can influence
military intervention decision-making” with its inclusion of “present
some options as unfeasible,” “selectively leak reservations to the press,”
and “hint at possible resignation,” along with provide “professional
expertise” and “alert civilian policymakers to risks and likely operational
costs,” are included side by side despite the issue the former suggestions
include behaviors that effectively undermine civilian control.
The case development at times also includes the political opinions
of the military along with the professional expertise civilians expect
regarding the operational limits of various options under consideration.
In the Haiti case, for example, Recchia wrote, “The top-level generals
and admirals disputed that important US national interests were at stake
in Haiti. They were skeptical about using force to restore democracy
and protect human rights and worried about getting bogged down in an
open-ended stabilization mission that the Congress might not support”
(81). It is not the role of senior military leaders to determine national
interest or to set policy. Manipulating the provision of professional
expertise in order to get the institution’s way on policy is a serious violation of professional norms related to civilian control. Some recognition
of this issue in the text would have strengthened the presentation of
the cases.
Overall, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors is a welcome addition to
civil-military relations literature in political science. Recchia wrote his
purpose was to build theory in such a way that it acknowledges the direct
and underappreciated role senior military leaders at the apex of politicalmilitary dialogue play in policy development. The text accomplishes
this goal with its outstanding case studies. Future and present military
leaders, however, should be careful to approach the book not so much
as a “user’s manual” for greater influence in the policy process, but as a
well-written and well-researched vehicle to analyze the actions of former
military leaders, who at times, may have exceeded their designated roles
in the “unequal dialogue.”

130

Parameters 46(4) Winter 2016–17

Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security
Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military –
Second Edition
By Derek S. Reveron
Reviewed by Benjamin Jensen, Associate Professor, Marine Corps University,
Scholar-in-Residence, American University School of International Service,
and author of Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Stanford
University Press, 2016)
Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2016
247 pages
$32.95

E

xporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation,
and the Changing Face of the US Military – Second Edition provides an excellent overview of the concept of theater shaping: how
military forces conduct cooperative engagements to advance the
interests of the United States. These activities, traditionally associated
with Phase 0, provide options for addressing what author Derek Reveron
calls security deficits, areas of instability that create persistent challenges
for US national security. The book provides the historical background
and policy context including PPD-23 and the 2015 National Military
Strategy behind the expanding definition of security to include practices
traditionally associated with development and diplomacy. According
to Reveron: “Presidents of all political persuasions continue to use the
military as a preferred tool of national power in noncoercive ways” (48).
From this perspective, the military is an engagement as much as it is
a coercive instrument, and the United States is “more concerned that
Pakistan will fail than it is that Russia will attack Western Europe” (4).
Because of the continued importance of theater shaping and Phase
0 activities, future researchers will need to enter the dialogue and ask
important questions based on Reveron’s work. First, a persistent theme
in the book is that the US military has undergone dramatic change
over the last three decades. There is also an implicit assumption that
“security cooperation programs have broadened the mission set for
the military beyond major combat” (4). If so, this change should be
apparent in major shifts in operational concepts and doctrine in
each service and, to a lesser extent, due to political influences, path
dependencies, force structure, and resource allocation. But, are
they? Does the US military, as measured by the individual service
doctrines and Program Objective Memorandum submissions, reflect a
prioritization of military engagement?
Second, do Phase 0 activities actually reduce security deficits?
Reveron contends that military engagement can “reduce other states’
security deficits created when subnational, transnational, or regional
challenges overwhelm a partner’s national security institutions” (43).
Yet, research by Dafna Rand and Stephen Tankel presented in Security
Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment (August 2015)
suggests the contrary. They found security cooperation and building
partner capacity initiatives often fail due to a misalignment of ends,
ways, and means as well as the underlying difficulty of measuring
progress. For Rand and Tankel “the failure to adequately assess efficacy contributes to the potential overreliance on security assistance
and cooperation as a tool of statecraft.” For scholars Gordon Adams
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and Shoon Murray, who edited Mission Creep: The Militarization of US
Foreign Policy? (2014) and whom Reveron addresses in the book, military
engagement and Phase 0 reflect the creeping militarization of US foreign
policy. The incoming administration needs a comprehensive, empirical
study on the correlates of reducing security deficits that measure
whether or not Phase 0 activities associated with military engagement
are working as intended.
Third, what other historical periods provide insights into the use
of military forces outside of battle? While the book offers maritime
examples over the land domain, the history of the US Army in Europe
also provides numerous cases of the importance of building interoperability as a means of enabling a conventional deterrent. Although
not human security challenges or linked to terrorism or piracy, these
examples will help military leaders frame the ways decision-makers
apply military forces to achieve national security objectives.
Reveron’s work in both editions of Exporting Security makes
important contributions to the framework academics and military
professionals should use to conceptualize plans for employing
military forces. Future research and staff estimates should concentrate
on additional questions about the efficacy of these military engagements and reflect on the broader range of military and diplomatic
historical practice.
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Security Studies
Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting
Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses – Second
Edition
By Stuart Gottlieb, Editor
Reviewed by William E. Kelly, Associate Professor of Political Science, Auburn
University
Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press,
2014
407 pages
$60.00

T

he international threat of dealing with terrorism raises interesting
questions and is a controversial topic. This controversy is reflected
in the revised second edition of Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism:
Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses which provides a
more expansive discussion than the first edition of how the international
community and organizations can cope with increasing threats.
Editor Stuart Gottlieb has an excellent professional background,
serving as a senior foreign policy adviser in the US Congress and
specializing in foreign policy, counterterrorism, and international
security research and coursework. He is optimistic about how the
United States is reacting to current dangers and believes the nation
is safer, the intelligence community better coordinated, and defenses
against terrorism stronger. Yet, he admits the threat from al-Qaeda
has not disappeared, and he divides the book into two sections with 12
chapters focusing on important issues related to the different types of
emerging threats.
The first section, “Debating Terrorism,” raises important questions:
Is the “new terrorism” really new? Does poverty serve as a root cause of
terrorism? Can terrorism ever be justified? Does Islam play a unique role
in modern religious terrorism? Is suicide terrorism an effective tactic? Is
nuclear terrorism a real threat?
The second section, “Debating Counterterrorism,” provides further
thoughts to consider as they relate to counterterrorism strategies and
the US Constitution: Do we need bombs over bridges? Can spreading
democracy help defeat terrorism? Can international organizations make
a difference in fighting terrorism? Is an outright ban the best way to
eliminate or constrain torture? Does providing security require a tradeoff with civil liberties? Is the threat of terrorism being overstated?
What makes this book so appealing is that it presents important
questions related to terrorism and provides answers from experts with
opposing views—an excellent way for readers to gain invaluable insights
into current threats. Gottlieb should be commended for both his
excellent choice of questions and his selection of expert contributors
who logically and understandably present their viewpoints. Debating
Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts,
and Responses – Second Edition will be of interest and benefit to anyone
planning for, and reacting to, the threats of modern-day terrorism.
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Drug Trafficking and International Security
By Paul Rexton Kan
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Adjunct Research Professor, US Army
War College, and Professor, International Relations and Comparative Politics,
Armstrong State University

T

o say drug trafficking is destroying societies and undermining
the legitimacy of states would be an understatement. Yet, despite
tremendous social, economic, and political ramifications, traditional
theories of international relations, with the primary unit of analysis
as the state, have downplayed this fact. Not so, for author Paul Kan.
In Drug Trafficking and International Security, he shows how “drug trafficking has evolved to become enmeshed in the most serious issues
affecting international security,” and how these “activities are significant
stressors on individuals, economies, societies, states, and the international
system” (184).
Following the implosion of the Soviet Union and the “end of
history,” global leaders thought the new international order would create
a more peaceful world; however, previous problems were replaced with
the emergence of new issues ranging from war, terrorism, migration,
human security, and global health to transnational organized crime. Kan
believes these issues, traditionally kept under control by authoritarian
regimes worldwide, have become integral parts of the new international
system, and “the fragmentation of power, rather than centralization of
power, will create new and unexpected security challenges based on
the convergence of many issues and actors that were once considered
separate and distinct from one another” (190).
Kan argues drug trafficking in the post-Cold War international
system should be treated as a unique security issue having detrimental
implications on the future of the nation-state and the consolidation of
democracy worldwide, especially among nascent democracies in developing countries. Drug trafficking, now an integral part of the “deviant
globalization” and “durable disorder” of the new international system
(12), is chipping away at the framework of society and intersects with
all other Cold War security issues as well as rogue nations, failing states,
intrastate conflicts, crime, public health, and cyberattacks (14).
As drug trafficking becomes another unit of analysis for
international relations practitioners, it is also giving rise to a new player
in the international system, narco-states. Narco-states, which can be
categorized as incipient, developing, serious, critical, and advanced,
according to Kan, exist “where the institutions of government direct
drug trafficking activities or actively collude with drug traffickers,
creating conditions where the elicit narcotics trade eclipses portions of
the country’s legitimate economy and where segments of society begin
to accrue benefits from drug trafficking. A narco-state thrives due
to its ability to exploit qualities of the state’s link to the legitimate
global economy” (51).
One important topic discussed by Kan, but often forgotten by
international relations practitioners, is how transnational organized
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criminal groups and drug traffickers have embraced the world’s third
revolution—the development of the Internet. These criminal groups
use the Internet to promote illicit activities (such as recruitment, money
laundering, extortion, and other nefarious interests) conducted on the
Deep Web, the Dark Web, or the Dark Net, an area of the Internet
encrypted from end-to-end and accessible only with special privileges
since communications within the Deep Web use programs such as The
Onion Router (TOR).
Deep Web societies can become fragile or failed states, further
contributing to the escalation of violence and suffering within the
countries while organized criminal groups enhance their power vis-à-vis
the government. In societies around the world where the legitimacy of
states is being questioned, drug trafficking creates a political vacuum.
Organized criminal groups willingly assume the traditional functions
of the state and see “a natural fit for drug trafficking activities because
they have geographic proximity to demand countries, trade networks
that extend to markets in developed countries, pliable policy forces and
customs agencies, viable airports or seaports, territory beyond governmental control, arable land, or accessibility to state assets” (74).
We do know that drugs corrupt and chip away the social fabric of
society. But, what are the national security implications and how does
drug trafficking affect international security? Kan points out several
national security implications political leaders should consider—or
ignore at their peril. First, government institutions become hallowed,
economies become predatory, and civil societies become criminalized
(95). Furthermore, the criminalization of society and its political and
judicial institutions undermines the rule of law in many countries. The
process of democratization, which in many parts of the world is still
being consolidated, also suffers in narco-states. As Kan argues, “in a
narco-state with democratic institutions, the hallmark of accountability
and transparency is replaced with corruption” (95).
Drug Trafficking and International Security clearly shows every
important aspect of the international security landscape has been
permeated and transformed by this problem (2). I highly recommend
this book to readers interested in political science and peace and
security studies. Given that many US Army War College students will
serve in the countries discussed by Kan, this book will aid in developing a
practical understanding of how drug trafficking interconnects with
multiple issues in today’s globalized world.

The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and
the New Incivility
By Jeffrey M. Berry and Sarah Sobieraj
Reviewed by James P. Farwell, National Security Expert; Associate Fellow,
Department of War Studies, Kings College, London; and author of Persuasion
& Power (Georgetown University Press, 2012)
New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
275 pages
$21.95

G

eorgetown law student Sandra Fluke testified before Congress,
arguing that religiously affiliated universities and hospitals should
provide insurance coverage for contraception. Radio talk show host Rush
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Limbaugh denounced her as a “slut” and a “prostitute.” His outburst
illustrated the media outrage that is perverting political discourse in
America today and which Jeffrey Berry and Sarah Sobieraj highlight in
their insightful book, The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the
New Incivility. More hosts are conservative, but no-holds-barred outrage
affects liberal hosts as well.
Some worry about Vladimir Putin’s propaganda campaigns.
But compared to American talk show hosts, the Russians are pikers.
Violent imagery, name-calling, personal attacks, homophobia, and dire
warnings are stock in trade. Glenn Beck carried a baseball bat onto
his TV set. Alan Colmes told listeners, “It’s going to be moron night,
isn’t it?” Keith Olbermann declared, “Sean Hannity doesn’t understand
that because Sean is very dim.” Mike Gallagher wanted the world to
know that “Anderson Cooper . . . he’s the last guy who should go on
television and make oral sex references.” Mark Levin invoked a clarion
call, “Nancy Pelosi’s politics come as close to a form of modern-day
fascism as I’ve ever seen.”
Berry and Sobieraj strongly prefer the older American news media
model on the grounds it better promotes fair play, objectivity, and
moderation and through these attributes makes the political system
function more smoothly. Their perspective is shaped by the impact and
role talk shows play in the political system.
The book identifies 13 variables that define talk show tactics:
insulting language, name-calling, emotional display, emotional language,
verbal fighting/sparring, character assassination, misrepresentation,
mockery, conflagration, ideologically extremizing language, slippery
slope argument, belittling, and obscenity. Mockery and misrepresentation top the list.
Talk shows have emerged at a time in which trust in traditional news
media has dropped. Talk show audiences are generally age 50 and above.
Economics drives their success. Talk shows can target advertising to
specific audiences. The old joke in advertising was, “I waste half my
money advertising. I just don’t know what half.” That is moot. Today’s
advertisers can identify niches that produce efficiency.
The top three talk show hosts reach a weekly audience of nearly
40 million. They appeal not despite being offensive but because they
are. Fox’s conservative Bill O’Reilly and liberal Ed Schultz entertain
and bond with their views. O’Reilly generates controversy. But the
implications in national security may be far reaching. Along with
iconic interviewer Larry King, Schultz recently signed onto Putin’s US
propaganda flagship, RT America. Their action encodes an important
Russian propaganda channel with an aura of legitimacy. It is startling.
Can one imagine American broadcast journalist Edward R. Murrow or
American journalist and war correspondent William L. Shirer copping
to Reich Minister of Propaganda Josef Goebbels’ information machine?
The most successful radio talk shows reach a highly engaged
audience. These audiences retain what they hear far better than music
show listeners, and they create strong bonds of trust in the personality
hosting the program with 72 percent of listeners talking to friends about
favorite radio personalities and another 70 percent following hosts on
social media. The best talk show hosts present themselves as regular
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folks. Hannity earns over $20 million and Limbaugh over $50 million,
but they are self-deprecating and refer to themselves as ordinary, “just
like listeners, evoking empathy and commonality.”
Outrage-based programming uses exaggeration, conspiracy theory,
and caricature. Talk shows are more about the experiences audiences
desire, not the information they provide. Audiences gain reassurance
that they are right. As one Limbaugh fan put it, “Rush is breaking it
down and saying, ‘this is why things are happening this way.’ That’s
what I think makes a good show because he’s got everybody going, ‘ah,
I understand that, that’s much better.’ ” The discourse helps audiences
to feel confident, celebrated for strong character and victorious in
political discussions.
Berry and Sobieraj incisively deconstruct the most popular talk
shows and explain why their popularity persists and grows. They
enlighten readers about American politics as well as the dynamics
of talk shows and how they affect attitudes and opinions, reaffirm
beliefs, and create distortions that polarize publics against themselves by
engaging emotions. In politics, reason persuades but emotion motivates.
This outstanding book offers a fine contribution to our understanding
of how and why this form of communication achieves both goals.

Book Reviews: Biography

137

Biography
Bush
By Jean Edward Smith
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College

I

n the last decade or so, numerous useful and controversial books have
been published on President George W. Bush and his administration.
To these works can now be added, Bush, a detailed and sometimes
searing study by Toronto University Professor Emeritus Jean Edward
Smith, a historian and biographer of American presidents and leaders,
including Ulysses S. Grant, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Marshall, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Smith displays a strong understanding of US history and provides
insightful, often harsh, assessments about Bush’s actions in office. Smith
declines to name Bush the worst president in American history, but he
strongly maintains Bush’s decision to invade Iraq was the most tragic
foreign policy error any US president has ever committed. He considers
the invasion to be a more serious blunder than the US intervention in
Vietnam because the collapse of friendly regimes in Southeast Asia did
not have the global repercussions of the Iraq War’s aftermath. He also
states the initial mistake of invading Iraq was further compounded by
the long-term occupation of the country with the goal of turning it into
a functioning democracy.
Although Smith’s most important observations relate to Bush’s time
as president, Bush is a full biography covering his entire life. In discussing
Bush’s early life, Smith presents his subject as an unserious young man,
with a distaste for academic learning and a strong streak of “cultivated
anti-intellectualism” he developed as a student and which was especially
strong before he married (14). Despite these views, Bush could never
have gotten as far as he did without important positive attributes beyond
a distinguished family and presidential father.
Bush often displayed remarkably good skills with people, which
served him well throughout his life. He appears to have been a competent
officer in the Texas Air National Guard and did well at the portions of his
business career that involved public relations and working with others.
He was also an extremely effective and enthusiastic politician. Unlike his
father, he loved campaigning and possessed tremendous energy for doing
so. Moreover, throughout his career, Bush never showed the slightest
signs of racism and was deeply sympathetic to the plight of immigrants,
at one time stating, “Family values do not stop at the Rio Grande” (104).
According to Smith, Bush was a humane, productive, and effective
governor in a state where the governor has very little formal power.
Unfortunately, the ability to serve effectively as a governor does
not, by itself, set one up for success as president. Bush knew almost nothing
about foreign policy but liked making decisions, even without knowing
all the important facts. Often, he treated his intuition as more important
than any effort to examine the costs and benefits of a particular policy. In
general, he did not want to be bothered with long discussions and efforts
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to explore all sides of an issue. In a world he often saw in black-and-white,
rigorous debate seemed unnecessary. Smith states Bush maintained
throughout his presidency “an unnerving level of certitude and a habit
of hiring support staff based on personal loyalty” rather than expertise
or experience (155). Once, while complaining about the extensive
level of detail in his briefing books, he said, “I don’t do nuance” (182).
At another point, he asserted, “If you know what you believe, decisions
come pretty easy” (213).
According to Smith’s analysis, the flaws in Bush’s governing style
and personality subsequently played out with tragic consequences when
he led the United States into the invasion of Iraq. Bush made no clear
effort to consider what might go wrong in the undertaking and later
could not understand Iraq’s sectarian problems or why they had become
a major impediment on the road to democracy. He had trouble accepting
the possibility Western-style democracy might not work in Iraq due to
the widespread lack of democratic values.
Smith, emphasizing the undeniable point that Bush wore his
religion on his sleeve, correspondingly makes a strong effort to understand the role Christianity played in Bush’s foreign policy decisions.
This is an excruciatingly difficult task to undertake since most American
politicians, and almost all Republican leaders, find it useful to claim
some level of religious belief and devotion. While an argument can be
made that Bush’s frequent expressions of piety were mostly good politics, Smith is not having any of this. Rather, he maintains Bush was not
exaggerating his strong belief that he was the instrument of God’s will
to destroy hostile dictatorships and spread democracy throughout the
Middle East.
Smith supports this thesis with quotes from Bush explaining
the Godly nature of the task at hand in Iraq. The intensity of these
beliefs also came through at more private moments, sometimes with
foreign leaders such as when Bush told French President Jacques
Chirac, “Biblical prophesies are being fulfilled. This confrontation is
willed by God” (339). The French leader was stunned by this and other
comments and later became unwilling to enter a war he feared was at
least partially based on Bush’s interpretation of the Bible. Additionally,
Donald Rumsfeld, Bush’s first secretary of defense, said, “Bush often
expressed his belief that freedom was a gift of the Almighty. He seemed
to feel almost duty bound to help expand the frontiers of freedom in the
Middle East” (357).
In summary, Smith maintains difficulties in Bush’s personality and
approach to problem-solving set the administration up for a series of
disastrous mistakes in Iraq. He suggests Bush never quite outgrew the
anti-intellectualism of his youth and the belief experts tended to overcomplicate simple matters of right and wrong. Moreover, Smith states
while Bush’s brand of moral certitude gave him an inner strength and
conviction, it also made it easier for him to dismiss the views of people
with whom he disagreed.
This sort of evaluation is strong stuff and is at odds with other
interpretations of the Bush administration, including those stressing
Bush was manipulated by ideologues within his administration. Smith
does not concede an inch to this interpretation. Rather, he sees Bush
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as a strong leader steering his presidency with an unwavering hand and
making key decisions he saw as the only moral alternative. With this
level of disagreement, neither Smith nor anyone else is going to resolve
these differences, even among Bush’s critics, but he has clearly presented
a powerful case that will be important for scholars and students to consider for years to come.

Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life
By Thomas Alexander Hughes
Reviewed by Albert F. Lord Jr., Director, Joint Warfighting Advanced Studies
Program, US Army War College

W

illiam F. Halsey Jr., a truly iconic figure in American military and
naval history whose outsize public persona was created and fueled
by a wartime press looking for a hero early in World War II, was known
for his fighting words “Hit hard, hit fast, hit often!” Thomas Alexander
Hughes delivers a remarkable biography on Halsey that cuts through the
mythology to show a man whose entire life was shaped by the shadow
of his father (a gifted naval officer in his own right), the navy, and his
personal struggle with the changes in naval warfare over the 47 years he
served in uniform.
Halsey’s birth into a navy family preordained his path into
the service. Graduating from the US Naval Academy in 1904, Halsey
was often the beneficiary of his father’s legacy as senior officers took
an interest in the son of a friend and messmate. He began his long
association with fast, smaller ships during an early assignment to torpedo
boat duty, and he formed his leadership style while working with these
intimate crews on the leading edge of new technology, doctrine, and
tactics. Another early influence was visionary reformer William Sims,
commodore of the Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla, who served as
Halsey’s superior both before and during World War I. Sims’s influence no
doubt played a role in Halsey’s decision later in his career, at the age
of 52, to apply for flight training and to thereafter push new ideas for
naval aviation as a strike force with a mission beyond just scouting
for battleships.
The attack on Pearl Harbor found Halsey commander of the Aircraft
Battle Force—the senior aviator afloat in charge of all aircraft carriers
in the Pacific Fleet. From January to May 1942, he was continually at
sea, attacking Japanese outposts and delivering Jimmy Doolittle’s
bombers on their epic, morale-raising raid of the Japanese homeland.
In October 1942, Halsey was called upon to take command of the
South Pacific Area and to hold Guadalcanal. His reputation and dogged
determination invigorated the tired and dispirited troops. Unafraid to
commit his precious carriers, aircraft, and surface forces, Halsey rushed
ground reinforcements into battle and saved the campaign. His relentless
fighting wore down the Japanese air, naval, and ground forces through
a war of attrition from which they never recovered.
In June 1944, Halsey departed the South Pacific Area for
command of the Third Fleet. The Japanese response to the invasion
of the Philippines in October 1944 led to the Battle of Leyte Gulf and
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the most controversial episode of Halsey’s life. In the midst of four
separate engagements, and suffering from a divided command
structure, Halsey, ever the aggressive leader, raced after the last
surviving Japanese carriers, leaving a crucial strait open to a powerful
Japanese surface force. Only valiant combat by American light escort
carriers and destroyers prevented a disaster to the invasion fleet.
Legitimately criticized thereafter for “taking the bait” and not hedging
his action by leaving a covering force behind, Halsey defended his
actions and in his autobiography criticized others for his failure.
After Leyte Gulf, Halsey led the Third Fleet on a rampage to
Formosa and the home islands of Japan and dealt a devastating blow
to the remaining Japanese armed forces and war machine. In two more
controversial events, Halsey’s fleet was caught in deadly typhoons in
December 1944 and June 1945. The ensuing damage to his reputation
left fleet sailors doubting for the first time Halsey’s capability to lead.
Remaining in command to the end of the war, Halsey submitted his
request for retirement shortly after the surrender and left active duty
following his elevation to the five-star rank of Fleet Admiral.
Throughout the book, Hughes humanizes Halsey, describing a career
naval officer who rose to the highest level of the profession by mastering
technology and leading change, but who at other times failed to grasp
the size and complexity of the US Fleet of late 1944 and 1945. Halsey’s
leadership style also comes through loud and clear—in most cases he
was firm but fair, sensitive to individuals; however, several instances
show he came up short in dealing with immediate subordinates and in
taking responsibility for shortcomings. A notable and unique strength
of the book is the backstory Hughes tells of Halsey’s medical conditions,
including a bout with depression, as well as his difficulties handling his
wife’s developing mental illness.
Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life is a superb biography of a man who
became larger-than-life in wartime service and who at critical times and
places tipped the scales with the force of his personality. Astute students
of history can easily draw parallels between Halsey’s leadership style and
the qualities required to lead today’s joint forces as well as the forces of
the future. Even readers familiar with Bill Halsey and the war in the
Pacific will develop a new appreciation for the challenges he faced in
wartime command and decision-making.

The Lost Mandate of Heaven: The American Betrayal of Ngo
Dinh Diem, President of Vietnam
By Geoffrey Shaw
Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, Professor of History, Georgia Southern
University

San Francisco, CA: Ignatius
Press, 2015
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T

he brutal assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình
Diem during the coup that overthrew his government on November
2, 1963, remains one of the most pivotal moments of American involvement in what was becoming the American war in Vietnam. Diem’s critics
believed the Catholic mandarin was doing more harm than good to his
country. With an intensifying Viet Cong insurgency threatening provincial
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regions across South Vietnam and internal strife taking the form of the
self-immolation of Buddhist monk Quang Pac, South Vietnam teetered
on the brink of collapse, so it seemed.
Diem had failed to implement social and political reforms demanded
by the Kennedy administration. With the political and military situations
worsening, President Kennedy reluctantly agreed with his more hawkish
advisers that Diem had to go. Never supportive of Diem, Kennedy’s new
ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., gave the
green light for a group of politically ambitious South Vietnamese army
generals to overthrow Diem and his corrupt government. In the confusion
of the coup, Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu met a bloody end
at the hands of their South Vietnamese army captors. Horrified at
Diem’s death, Kennedy subsequently distanced himself from approving
the coup, the results of which arguably sank the United States deeper,
terminally so, into the quagmire of Vietnam.
This is largely the story reported at the time and repeated most often
by historians. Well-supported arguments by Fredrik Logevall in Choosing
War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (1999) and
Howard Jones in the compelling Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations
of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War (2003) conclude that although
Diem may have had to go, his “going” undermined Kennedy’s plans
for a gradual withdrawal of American military support and led to direct
involvement in the conflict in Vietnam. Just over two weeks after Diem’s
death, Kennedy was assassinated, leaving the Vietnam morass to Vice
President Lyndon B. Johnson. The rest, as they say, is history—a tragic
and needless history.
Welcome to this historiographic discussion Geoffrey Shaw, a
former assistant professor for American Military University and current
president of the Alexandrian Defense Group, a counterinsurgency
warfare think tank. In The Lost Mandate of Heaven, Shaw provocatively
argues Diem did not have to go. Shaw’s Diem is a pious Catholic,
dedicated to preserving South Vietnamese independence against the
Sino-Soviet sponsored insurgency to unify Vietnam under a Communist
regime based in Hanoi. Throughout his career as a government
official, from district chief to president of the Republic of Vietnam, Diem
effectively served a nation fighting for its survival. He led through a
delicate balancing act that pitted his deep desire to resolve the social and
economic issues affecting his country against the demands of the United
States, which made his country an American proxy against monolithic
Communist expansion.
The Kennedy administration, Shaw notes, betrayed Diem first
by undermining his legitimacy as president through heavy-handed
American interference in South Vietnam’s domestic affairs, then
ultimately by supporting the coup that ended Diem’s government and
his life. Shaw places responsibility for Diem’s brutal killing indirectly
on President Kennedy, but more eloquently blames a cabal of anti-Diem
officials in the State Department, led by Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman, for setting the stage for Diem’s
overthrow. Unlike former Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick
Nolting Jr., CIA Chief of Station in Saigon William Colby, Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara, and Johnson, who all believed Diem to be
the best option the United States had to save South Vietnam, Harriman,
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Senator Mike Mansfield, and others conspired to end the corrupt,
increasingly despotic (as they saw it) regime of Diem and his brother.
The Saigon press corps eagerly, if not unwittingly, played a supporting
role in Diem’s overthrow. Shaw portrays these reporters as hostile
toward Diem, unyielding in their criticism of his nepotism and what
they perceived as dictatorial tactics against the people of South Vietnam.
The Viet Cong needed no propaganda; the Saigon press corps spread it
for them.
Shaw presents a well-researched, thoroughly documented, and
provocative, if not compelling, case. Surprising is Harriman’s influence
on Kennedy at the expense of Diem’s supporters in the administration.
Shaw also explores the pressure of the upcoming 1964 presidential
election on Kennedy, in which the last thing Kennedy needed was for
Southeast Asia to become the key negative issue. The press, Shaw most
convincingly argues, was already headed down that path.
The Lost Mandate of Heaven is a strong and thoughtful reconsideration
of Diem. While some readers may not find all of the book convincing,
it deserves attention. Ultimately, all readers should agree, Diem’s
“Mandate from Heaven” was not enough to prevent his overthrow and
save his life. Even Ho Chi Minh thought removing Diem from power a
fatal mistake for the imperialist Americans.
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Military History
Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar
Edited by Jason W. Warren
Reviewed by Brian McAllister Linn, Professor of History, Texas A&M
University, and author of Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield
(Harvard University Press, 2016)

I

t is always difficult for a historian to review a book on a topic that
has, or should have, much to contribute to a contemporary military
issue. Should the reviewer focus on the book’s historical importance or
speculate on its current relevance? The problem is compounded in an
edited volume of articles, each of which has to be assessed both for
academic worth and as guidance for the present. Unfortunately, Drawdown:
The American Way of Postwar is likely to frustrate both historians and those
interested in the debates over current defense reductions. Despite some
excellent individual essays, the book is inadequately organized and edited,
providing neither a coherent interpretation of “the American way of
postwar” nor guidance for today’s military realities.
The forward by Peter Mansoor and the introduction by Michael E.
Lynch make a commendable effort to impose intellectual consistency.
Lynch, referencing one of the chapter titles, postulates a “liberty
dilemma” in which the requirement for military forces to defend national
security is countered by the public’s fear of military influence and
socioeconomic costs. It is a valiant attempt, but Lynch struggles to locate
an American way of postwar in a book that is less a collective effort than
a diverse collection of essays reflecting a variety of research interests.
Three essays on the post-Vietnam drawdown offer a model that
might well have served for the rest of the book, and certainly would
have made Lynch’s task easier. Individually they provide both historical
narrative and provocative interpretation. Together, they form a coherent,
integrated analysis of the drawdown experience since Vietnam.
In a tight, well-researched essay, Conrad C. Crane explores what he
terms the “myth of the Abrams doctrine.” His admirers have credited the
general with so intertwining the active and reserve components of the
military that no president could go to war without both—thus somehow
insuring political and popular commitment to future conflicts. Crane
questions whether this was ever Abrams’ purpose and concludes, “if he
actually did have that goal . . . he failed miserably” (249).
Antulio J. Echevarria II offers an insightful critique of what
others have mythologized as the “good drawdown” in which “prodigal
soldiers” restored the US Army’s pride and competence. The service’s
focus on one mission for nearly two decades—deterring or defeating
the USSR in western Europe—inspired reforms in doctrine, equipment,
concepts, force structure, training, and so on—all of which appeared
to be justified in the quick triumph of Desert Storm, and increasingly
irrelevant thereafter.
Richard A. Lacquement Jr. provides a significant investigation of
the post-Cold War drawdown, concluding that a combination of inertia,
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emerging if relatively low-level threats, and global ambitions left the
armed forces comparatively untouched. Comfortably fixated on waging
war against a peer competitor, they had a difficult time adapting to the
unconventional challenges of the twenty-first century.
All three essays complement each other, raising common themes
and ideas and taking them forward from the end of the Vietnam War
to the Iraq-Afghanistan conflicts. Studied together, these chapters will
benefit both historians and students of the current drawdown.
Other chapters are also worth reading as individual essays, but of
less relevance to the subject of drawdown. Samuel Watson’s chapter,
spanning roughly the end of the American Revolution to the Mexican
War, argues that the reduction of the Army’s officer corps in 1820
increased corporate professionalism by purging wartime veterans
unfit for garrison duty. The implications for today are important, if
disturbing. Edward A. Gutiérrez and Michael S. Neiberg summarize
the four decades between the Spanish-American War and World War
II. They see a slow but steady improvement in professional skill and
institutional competence, some of it due to the Army having so little to
do. Michael R. Matheny examines education at Fort Leavenworth and
the War College between the World Wars. Lacking both resources and
personnel to train for war, the Army wisely devoted itself to intellectual
preparation, educating its best and brightest in the complexities of
national mobilization. Raymond Millen’s overview of the post-Korea
reduction in forces is a well-researched, cogent defense of Eisenhower’s
strategic priorities, though readers might wish he had devoted more
attention to the New Look’s effects on the field forces.
If the majority of the essays are good to superior, why is Drawdown
unsatisfactory as a book? In my view, an edited volume should be more
than a collection of individual chapters: the sum should be better than
the parts. And, a work that appears marketed to readers interested in
current military reductions should have essays that draw clear parallels
with today’s events. By these standards, Drawdown is a disappointment.
Whether from an author’s caprice or a lack of editorial oversight, too
many essays meander into wartime operations or colonial militia at the
expense of a discussion of how this nation has demobilized its wartime
forces. Readers will find some excellent solo chapters, but barring the
three integrated essays on the post-Vietnam era they will not find an
explanation of the American way of postwar.

Bushwhackers: Guerilla Warfare, Manhood, and the
Household in Civil War Missouri
By Joseph M. Beilein Jr.
Reviewed by CPT David Krueger, Scholar of American History, Harvard
University, with Dr. Walter Johnson, Winthrop Professor of History, Professor
of African and African American Studies, and Director, Charles Warren Center
for Studies in American History, Harvard University
Kent, OH: Kent State
University Press, 2016
304 pages
$34.95

T

he vast collection of work on the American Civil War can make it
difficult to identify meaningful gaps in the historiography or to find
novel methods, approaches, or arguments to further our understanding
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of the conflict’s history. In Bushwhackers: Guerilla Warfare, Manhood, and
the Household in Civil War Missouri, Joseph M. Beilein Jr. embraces these
challenges and succeeds in providing a new thematic study of guerilla
warfare in Union-occupied Missouri that productively links elements of
social and military history. He argues the guerillas of Civil War Missouri
waged a “household war” in which men were connected, motivated,
and sustained by networks of family and kin. This viewpoint challenges
caricatures of guerillas as predatory outcasts, instead depicting their
war effort as a system of community defense that mobilized the entire
spectrum of Southern social hierarchy, within which roles and allegiances
were shaped by age, gender, class, and race.
The book is arranged around specific arguments and themes
rather than a chronological narrative, so readers unfamiliar with the
characters and events discussed may struggle to place the evidence in
historical context or to form clear lines of causation. The first three
chapters lay the framework of the argument, outlining the contention
that the strategy, tactics, and logistics of guerilla warfare were products
of the gendered roles, relationships, and identities of the antebellum
household. The strength of Beilein’s research is evident in this section,
which uses census data, provost marshal records, and guerilla memoirs
to piece together 122 separate rebel households, and then divides
them into two distinct groups organized around bonds of kinship in
resistance to Union occupation. Describing these groups as the “Fristoe”
and “Holtzclaw” systems of warfare, Beilein persuasively demonstrates
how these distributed networks of autonomous households were
effectively connected by family bonds and shared notions of deference
and hospitality and fulfilled reciprocal needs of protection, logistics,
and intelligence gathering across a guerilla band’s area of operations,
satisfying both military and social necessities.
The remainder of the book addresses the material culture of guerilla society, analyzing both the practical uses and social meanings of
food, clothing, horses, armaments, and rituals of remembrance. Beilein
demonstrates how the domestic production and agricultural labor
of women were sufficient to keep the guerillas adequately fed and
clothed, negating the necessity for pillaging beyond retribution against
anti-Southern households and communities. More important, by providing for the logistical needs of the fighters, women became active
participants in the guerilla system and reinforced mutual social bonds
and obligations. In addition, Beilein argues the guerillas’ choices to be
mounted and to adopt the Colt revolver were due not only to military
advantages of mobility and firepower but were also products of a “horse
culture” and notions of martial masculinity that valued individual skill
and courage as markers of manhood.
Perhaps Beilein’s greatest contribution in Bushwhackers is his attempt
to analyze guerilla warfare through a gendered lens, which challenges
conventions within military history and shows clearly in his endnotes
and bibliography. His secondary sources center on a constellation
of social and gender history scholars like Elizabeth Fox-Genovese,
Amy S. Greenberg, Nancy F. Cott, Kathleen M. Brown, Stephanie
McCurry, John Mack Faragher, and his mentor LeeAnn Whites. These
sources give him excellent scaffolding for theorizing about a system of
family- and community-based warfare, one that both contrasts with
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and complements social histories of conventional forces like Edward
Coffman’s. For scholars of counterinsurgency, this book may prove a
useful case study on how irregular forces can subsist and succeed outside
conventional logistical networks and a cautionary note on developing
strategies to combat insurgencies at the household or community level.
While Beilein’s research is thorough and convincing, and his
thematic chapters will have topical interest to scholars beyond the field
of military history, his characterizations of both Union and Confederate
regulars in the broader conflict are likely to draw criticism. In an effort to
emphasize the culture of masculine individuality that guerillas embraced,
he casts the regular soldier broadly as its antithesis, where the relationship between soldier and firearm “corroded his identity as a man” (152).
He crafts an elaborate contrast between the yeoman farmer of the
South, who mastered the land and his weapon as signs of his manhood
and independence, against factory workers and regular soldiers, who
existed as unskilled and timid cogs in the hierarchical machinery of
industrial warfare.
If military discipline and distance from family are what distinguish
the regular soldier from the guerilla, it must be considered a difference
of degree rather than one of type. Soldiers in the Union and Confederate
armies remained individuals and maintained reciprocal bonds with their
families and communities that profoundly shaped their experiences, a
reality broadly reflected in the literature of the conflict. Simplifications
of the regular military experience like this occasionally betray Beilein’s
shallow dive into conventional military history beyond Missouri, but
within his field of expertise and the scope of his primary argument,
Bushwhackers is a welcome addition to the historiography of the American
Civil War.
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his eye-opening book cuts a path into unfamiliar territory—
the Austro-Hungarian invasions of Serbia and the subsequent
occupation of Serbia to the end of the Great War. In current joint
terminology, the book focuses on an extended Phase IV (to stabilize),
with a particular twist on Phase V (to enable civil authority).
The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918
is well written, researched, and organized, but it is a difficult book to
read. The subject is unfamiliar, as Austrian institutions and mindsets
are unlike German or Prussian, of which American readers are familiar.
The text cites, for example, Austria-Hungary’s three regular armies. The
Common Army, however, with central funding was the only one entitled
to the categorization of k.u.k. (Kaiserlich und Königlich, Imperial and Royal).
The other two were the Austrian Landwehr and the Hungarian Honved,
again, neither reserve nor militia.
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The detailed introduction lays out the thesis and major elements
of evidence while subsequent chapters are thematic. The conclusion
summarizes points of emphasis made throughout the book. Gumz
organizes and integrates these components effectively as he investigates
how Austrian authorities structured and implemented the occupation of
a conquered Serbia, provides an analysis of civil-military relations, and
discusses historiography. He highlights, for example, how evidence is at
variance with much post-war Serbian narrative of the Habsburg revenge.
Senior Austrian officers possessed hardened, peacetime beliefs.
They assumed a short war as did many, if not most, of their friends
and foes. More significantly, Austrian military culture viewed the army
and the business of waging war as distinct from civilian society and
internal politics. The army represented duty, objectivity, and justice,
ostensibly without bias, in a domestic world torn by nationalist passions
and notions of democratization. Civil-military relations were poor and
preciously little.
In 1914, the Austrian officer corps approached the outbreak of
war with Serbia as an aberration. Wed to a limited-war tradition and
a commitment to international norms, they abhorred a foe whom
they understood to have radicalized warfare via a levée en masse with
complete civilian participation. They expected to have to deal with
wholesale popular atrocities, and their typical responses included
threats, hostages, and executions. Gumz is emphatic that Austrian
retaliation was dependent upon the specific incident and how Austrian
commanders rejected universal total-war solutions, remaining tied to
certain institutional, moral, and legal boundaries. Frankly, the responses
were brutal.
Subsequently, Serbian occupation was under the military government of Serbia. The military governor answered directly to the chief of
the general staff. Serbia was a military preserve, deliberately earmarked
for civilian exclusion. The first preeminent mission was to denationalize
and depoliticize conquered Serbia in preparation for its becoming part of
Habsburg territory, the subject of Chapter 2. Thus, reestablished schools
had soldier-teachers, though a teacher shortage was an early challenge. A
police network targeted intelligentsia in a structure which saw policing
as a military-intelligence function. The government’s most powerful
weapon was internment, that is, transportation to a different part of
the empire. A new, harsher military governor and fears of an uprising
in the wake of Russia’s Brusilov Offensive in June 1916 and Romanian
entrance into the war as an ally of the Entente in August 1916 brought
mass internments. These actions soon became counterproductive due to
little to no coordination with other governmental agencies, worsening
labor shortages in a long war, and international opinion.
The law is the focus of Chapter 3. In brief, Serbia endured the
most severe form of the increased permeation of military law into civil
society throughout the wartime empire. The explanations are the army’s
military culture discussed above and the endorsement by the Austrian
civilian minister-president. Space precludes a more detailed discussion.
The text lays out the specifics, to include precise terms and procedures.
Their easement came with the succession of Prinz Karl as emperor upon
the death of Franz Joseph in November 1916.
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Chapter 4 concerns food. The Austrians decided definitively to
preclude starvation in Serbia. Ironically, Serbia became a sort of imperial
bread basket. The reasons rest upon relative success within Serbia and
worsening conditions throughout the empire, but particularly in Austria,
the Hinterland. The army’s total control over Serbia and its anathema
over civilian interference make for quite a case study of interagency
operations to distribute food outside Serbia.
From 1917, the military government of Serbia had to deal with
internal warfare. The initial Austrian response viewed the scenario as
civil war with mass uprising, much like their perspective in 1914. Leaders
slowly came to realize that the enemy was more localized guerillas with
limited numbers, who could not count on widespread popular support
and hence punished civilian elements. Therefore, the Austrians changed
their methods from larger-unit sweeps to platoon-level jagdkommandos,
who tracked and laid ambushes. Ironically, this war evolved to Austrian
forces becoming protectors of the population caught in a civil war
of sorts.
The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia underscores
the requirement to understand the past from the perspective of the
participants, not the perspective of the readers. The book’s conclusions
provide statements with wider implications, including the increasing
role of guerrilla war during the Great War and what the occupation
of Serbia was not—another example of European colonial domination
or a historical progression of events which led to the worst atrocities
of the Third Reich.

